This paper constitutes a critical review of the concept of multiple states of balance and the associated idea of self-fulfilling expectations. The occurrence of multiple states of balance and self-fulfilling expectations represents a conclusion derived from second-generation currency crisis models. If the assumptions behind these models, including rational expectations and highly accurate forecasts, are taken into account, the stated conclusion - pointing to the absence of an unambiguous outcome - seems slightly surprising. It also clearly contrasts with conclusions generated from first-generation currency crisis models whose output is always unambiguous unless it depends on the variability of a factor not explained by the model. The paper does not discuss the mathematical formula of second-generation models, which always accept the existence of more than one solution. However, multiple states of balance are questioned, using arguments suggesting that only one of mathematical solutions of the model constitutes a viable state of economic balance. These arguments refer to the basis of the conclusion regarding the occurrence of multiple states of balance which, in turn, relies on the theory of strategic games.