The process of systemic transformation in Poland has abounded in numerous complex - and so difficult to tackle - problems relating to all aspects of the economic, political and social life. The areas of monetary and fiscal policy have not remained unaffected. Ten years of experience in this field provides sufficient material to assess the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in the period. Both policies, while working to different intermediate targets, pursue the same ultimate goals, namely economic growth, lower unemployment and lower inflation. It is only possible to attain these goals when monetary and fiscal authorities operate in concert.

In the times of a systemic transformation (such as the one Poland is still experiencing) the coordination of the two policies is tested hard, due to factors of both of economic and political nature. In Poland, during the past decade periods of close cooperation alternated with periods of separate action. Several factors have contributed to lack of coordination, including inflationary pressures, large external debt, the central bank's aspirations to independence as well as the personality of the people at the helm of the two authorities.

The central bank's efforts to enhance its independence (the National Bank of Poland was considered relatively independent anyway), did not result only from the desire to remove policy making from the Government or Parliament influence (especially with respect to key principles of monetary policy, or collective decision making in central bank management). It was also consistent with the basic central bank regulations of the Maastricht Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks. Moreover, it was justified by the experience of the past.

A major step in consolidating NBP's independent position was the adoption of the new Constitution in 1997 with its Article 227, and subsequently the Act on the National Bank of Poland. The independence of the central bank is not an obstacle to coordinating monetary and fiscal policy; it creates greater opportunity for the monetary authorities to choose the platform for this coordination. The experience of many developed countries proves that central banks typically choose to cooperate with the parliaments and governments towards economic growth and social development in their countries.