Both settlement systems offered by KIR SA are netting systems, characterised by a lag between the receipt of a payment order and the settlement. Since KIR SA operates on the basis of multilateral balancing of debits and credits and there are no mechanisms securing settlement, the entire session may be brought to a halt if only one of the participants lacks the funds required by KIR. This systemic flaw may result in a domino effect, lethal to payment systems. KIR is currently moving away from the SYBIR system based on paper documents towards the ELIXIR system, by gradually increasing the number and value of transactions concluded under the latter. KIR's strategic plan for the years 2001-2005 assumes a complete winding up of the SYBIR system by 2004. If these plans go ahead, ELIXIR will become the sole settlement systems operated by KIR SA. In the author's opinion this calls for its radical modification, possibly to the point of creating a new system. This should be based on slightly different principles, especially with respect to the so-called guarantee of settlement.

The need to seriously remodel the ELIXIR system follows from its significance to the banking sector, and the related problem of the security of financial settlements. ELIXIR accounts rougly for 25% of the total volume of settlements within the Polish payment system. This figure speaks for itself. The author seeks to prove that under potential competition from EU clearing houses ELIXIR will not stand a chance of survival: the mechanism excluding a participant who does not hold sufficient balances on account with KIR is a potential source of systemic risk.

Apart from the basic problem of settlement guarantee, the author also deals with other isssues such as the participants in the system and the number of settlement sessions, the latter being a fundamental aspect of the institution's operation.