The Constitution of the Polish Republic repeatedly makes uses of the term "policy" preceded by various adjectives aiming to specify the term - but does not define it in a manner which would capture the nature of the phenomenon.

Monetary policy, i.e. activities by central banks through which they maintain the stability of their currencies is implemented by exerting pressure on various agents within the payments system. This pressure, exercised through the application of a number of instruments strives to reduce the volume of purchases, especially where credit money is involved. Such policies are typical under inflationary threats.

What follows the above description is that policy is about influencing people´s behaviour and preferences. In other words, it means exerting influence through the application of norm policy instruments - that is, principles of behaviour. In trying to define policy - at least in the light of our Constitution - one should describe it as organized activity by a person or group of people (corporate bodies) aimed at preserving, changing or destroying the norms prevailing in the relevant social group.

Monetary policy instruments have been defined in Chapter 6 of the Act on the National Bank of Poland. This means that the Polish central bank must not - in spite of its considerable independence - apply any instruments other than those provided for by the Act (or other legislation). Policy instruments are seldom defined by law. However, in the case of the NBP, the Constitution does not allow discretionary decisions. The Act on the National Bank of Poland specifies the range of instruments the Bank has at its disposal.

At the same time, the Constitution has lifted the central bank´s power to make generally binding laws. However, some of the policy instruments described by the NBP Act are exactly of that character. These instruments include: setting the level of required reserves (and defining the method of calculation), imposing credit ceilings on banks or obliging investors to deposit currencies in a non-interest bearing account in the NBP if they undertake high-risk portfolio (i.e. "speculative investment").

A question thus arises whether NBP´s legal situation as defined by the Act might be in conflict with the Constitution. That might mean that the bank is not in the position to implement its monetary policy, even though by virtue of the Constitution it makes independent decisions in this respect.

The answer to this question - by no means a rhetorical one, considering the recent enquiry by the President of the National Audit Office´s addressed to Constitutional Tribunal - should be negative. Monetary policy, like any other policy exercised by administrative bodies in various areas, is not restricted to issuing legal acts. It may also consist in stimulating various economic responses; and may in this case be left at the recourses of the subject creating the policy. Policy in general is a combination of different types of action, which should be coordinated and made effective by the organisation in charge.

Monetary policy follows naturally from another core competence of the central bank, that of issuing the currency. Currency is the central bank´s liability towards all those holding the currency. These agents may demand that their currency holdings be converted into another currency, at a rate accounced in NBP´s daily bulletins.

Since the Constitution puts the issue of currency and its stability in charge of the central bank, the duties it is vested with, termed "policy" should be seen as a specific competence granted in a manner characteristic of this kind of powers. Otherwise one would be condemned to considerations whether the Constitution itself is constitutional. Such an approach would be unacceptable in trying to interpret laws. When verifying the compliance of various laws with the Constitution, we must assume that the Constitution itself is consistent and unequivocal.