In 1999, the monetary union of eleven European states, with a single currency as a base, has become a reality. This historic event has changed the fundamental subject of a discussion held around this issue. Instead of a question on terms and chances of establishing the union, interests focus on conditions for its continuation and smooth functioning in the shorter and longer time perspective. Whether and, eventually, what are its threats, what are the chances for achieving EMU objectives, and to what extent these objectives (and related constraints) could be reconciled with actions taken by member states within a framework of their own economic policies - this is the current meaning of the key question arising after opening of a new chapter of the European economic history. For Poland (and other Central European states aspiring to join the EU) monetary unification within EMU brings about the necessity to shift time horizons of the economic and political strategy, and to ask a question whether it is proper to aim at the EU membership and replacing zloty with euro, and if yes, how quickly and how to achieve this.

Consistency of EMU may be tried out due to so called asymmetric shocks of an internal or external origin, real or monetary, supply or demand nature. Getting rid by the EU members of the exchange rate instrument and an autonomic monetary policy may lead to a conflict of immediate interests between member states, and between individual members and the group as a whole. Conflicts would be easier to overcome if:

1. Salaries are both sides elastic;
2. Labor force could move freely;
3. EMU was politically consistent enough to have a substantial and common budget allowing for financial transfers for a sufficient scale.

Up to now the requirements have not been met. Related implications can be better perceived through the theory of an optimum currency area in its different options. General conclusion is that the first several years will pose a particular threat to the stability of EMU. If pressures persist, time will "work" in support of the efficiently functioning and enhancing the economic growth union. The elapse of time itself will, however, not substitute necessary institutional and structural reforms. Since growth opportunities implied by the union depend on the creation of conditions promoting the inflow of investment and innovations. As time goes on additional, new threats arising both from the members' attempts to enhance their relative competitive position vis a vis their partners and some spontaneous social processes occurring in the integrated area may be revealed. Thus, everything may happen, and the continuation of EMU is not guaranteed yet. Poland must take this into account. Its economic and political strategies should be sustainable to different, unexpected developments in EMU internal situation.

Generally, however, (and irrespectively of what may happen to EMU) the strategy of eventual replacement of the zloty with euro is consistent with long-term interests of Poland, and would also make sense in case EMU was in crisis (and even collapsed). In fact it is the extrapolation of the whole existing transformation program, and the final decision - positive or negative - will be, anyway, taken based on own and others experience accumulated till that time. At the same time both recently promoted strategies of irresponsible "jump" into the integration with euro area and unjustified postponement of related actions into a distant future should be rejected. Smooth and early accession to the European Monetary Union in its existing, modified version (not necessarily for a two-year period) would represent an important strengthening of the monetary policy reliability, an action in line with the strategy of further disinflation based on direct inflation targeting (with its advantages and disadvantages), and actions to make the exchange rate floating stable and safe. The approach does not exclude exchange rate adjustments, if necessary, and, in case this reconciliation was agreed with the ECB, it would provide for support and an early accession into the system of coordinating actions in the monetary policy area.